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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to the Utah 
Supreme Court Clerk's Order of Transfer dated March 10, 1989, Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) and (b) (1953 as amended), and 
§78-2a-8(2) (f), whereby a defendant in a criminal matter may take 
an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for a third degree felony. 
vi 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in not 
properly disposing of defendant's motion to disqualify the trial 
judge? 
2. Did the trial court err by not ruling on defendant's 
motion for a new trial? 
3. Was it an abuse of its discretion for the trial court to 
deny defendant's motion to withdraw his plea where (a) the trial 
court failed to explain the facts and elements of the offense to 
defendant, (b) the trial court knew the defendant had trouble 
hearing and understanding the proceedings, (c) the trial court was 
advised by defendant's trial counsel that defendant did not 
adequately hear or understand the plea agreement, (d) defendant 
and his counsel were confused as to the crime charged and the 
impact of defendant's plea, and (e) the record fails to show that 
the trial judge complied with Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
4. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel, 
throughout trial and at the taking of defendant' s plea by (a) 
counsel's failure to disqualify himself as to one defendant, (b) 
counsel's failure to investigate the facts, witnesses and valid 
defenses, and (c) counsel's failure to move to disqualify the 
trial judge. 
vii 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-29(c) and (d) (1989, Repl. Vol. 8C) 
provides: 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal 
action or proceeding files an affidavit that the judge before 
whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a 
bias or prejudice, either against the party or his attorney 
or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, the judge shall 
proceed no further until the challenge is disposed of. Every 
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon 
as practicable after the case has been assigned or the bias 
or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that the 
affidavit and the application are made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency 
of the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order 
directing that a copy be forthwith certified to another named 
judge of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
allegations. If the challenged judge does not question the 
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the case or 
to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit 
is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally 
sufficient, he shall enter a finding to the effect and the 
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-11(5) (1989 Repl. Vol. 8C) provides: 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has 
found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, 
he h^s knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desir^ counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all 
of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
viii 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement 
has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 1.7(b), Rules of 
Professional Conduct provides: 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation 
to each client of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks involved. 
IX 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890145-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Frank D. Gentry, plead guilty to Theft, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as 
amended) on January 25, 1989. The Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth 
District Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah, denied Mr. 
Gentry's motion to withdraw his plea. Mr. Gentry appeals from the 
trial courtTs memorandum decision denying his motion to withdraw 
his plea. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Milton H. Gentry and Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry together had 
six children: Ruby Jane Gentry (Roberts), Mary Lou Gentry 
(Roberts), Mack N. Gentry, Joseph Gentry, William Larry Gentry 
(deceased), and defendant. (Tr. 47, 61). 
Milton H. Gentry owned a ranch located in the vicinity of the 
Beaver/Iron County Line in Southern Utah. The ranch consisted of 
7 parcels but was basically separated and referred to as the upper 
and lower ranch and a third parcel for a total of approximately 
1,840 acres. Parcel A is situated along 1-15 and consists of 
approximately 640 acres. Parcel B (lower ranch) is located 2 to 
3 miles East of 1-15 at Exit 100 and consists of 281 acres. 
Parcel C (upper ranch) is located 5 miles East of the lower ranch 
and consists of approximately 920 acres. The upper and lower 
sections of the ranch have access to water. The three parcels, 
A, B, and C, are known as the Fremont Ranch.1 (Tr. 17, 34, and 
Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts2 attached to Addendum A). 
In 1949, defendant built a cinderblock cabin on the Fremont 
Ranch and later lived there with his wife, Mona Lou, and their 
three children. (R. 56, Tr. 118). 
Defendant worked the Fremont Ranch on a daily basis installing 
fencing, digging ditches, cutting timber, caring for cattle, 
operating a Christmas tree concern, and providing a refuge for 
hunters. (R. 56, Tr. 118). 
On September 7, 1962 defendants' father, Milton H. Gentry, 
died and was buried on the upper section of the Fremont Ranch. 
(Tr. 18, 167). By a holographic will, Milton H. Gentry left the 
Fremont Ranch to his wife, Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry, and their six 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 which appears to be a map of the 
property is not contained in the exhibit file. (Tr. 17). 
2Ruby Jane Robert's Affidavit was filed after the record 
was prepared and transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
facts set our in Ms. Roberts1 affidavit and in the attached 
exhibits would have been presented to the court to support 
defendant's position that the 1981 partition sale was void, 
however, the trial court failed to consider this issue. 
2 
children, Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, Mack N. Gentry, Joseph 
Gentry, William Larry Gentry (now deceased),3 Mary Lou (Gentry) 
Roberts, and defendant. (Tr. 119). 
On January 11, 1966, defendant's mother, brothers and sisters 
executed a power of attorney in favor of defendant allowing 
defendant to promote, operate and manage the Fremont Ranch. (Tr. 
54-55, 120, D-l). 
In 1967, Spencer Roberts, Mary Lou (Gentry) Roberts1 husband, 
questioned defendant's authority to manage the Fremont Ranch. 
Spencer Roberts wanted to run cattle on the newly seeded pasture. 
Defendant objected because the cattle would destroy the seed bed. 
(Tr. 121-122). As a consequence of the quarrel, in 1967, attorney 
Ken Chamberlain wrote a letter to Ron Bradshaw telling him that 
defendant no longer had the power to lease the property to Mr. 
Bradshaw. (Tr. 122). 
Although the record in somewhat unclear, defendant's mother, 
Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry, died intestate. Ken Chamberlain 
probated her estate. (Tr. 12, See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) 
Roberts inr 2 and 4). 
On November 20, 1974, defendant appeared at the probate 
hearing regarding the estate of Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry to ask 
questions and to state his objection to the administrators 
3William Larry Gentry and William's wife, Glenda Hawley, 
predeceased their two children, leaving their one-sixth interest 
in the Freemont Ranch to their surviving children, Larry Gentry 
(son) and Andrea Gentry Breinholt (daughter). (Tr. 12). 
3 
approved by the Court. After the hearing, on November 20, 1974, 
Ken Chamberlain sent a letter to Joseph F. Gentry, Mack [R.] 
Gentry, Mary Lou (Gentry) Roberts, Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, and 
Glenda S. Hawley stating that at the probate hearing defendant 
claimed he owned 100% interest in the Milton H. Gentry estate and 
that Ivy Jane Erickson's entire estate be awarded to him. Mr. 
Chamberlain represented there would be three lawsuits involving 
(1) the estate of Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry, (2) the estate of 
Milton H. Gentry, and (3) a partition action to divide the 
property should the judge decide defendant is not entitled to all 
of the interests he claims. (See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) 
Roberts, 1Mf 5 and 6). 
Mr. Chamberlain goes on to state in his letter that the heirs 
will need adequate representation to counter defendant's claims 
to be asserted which will be time consuming and complicated. Mr. 
Chamberlain enclosed with his letter a contingent fee agreement 
providing that he take 1/4 of the Fremont Ranch if he prevails or 
obtained some recovery. (See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) 
Roberts, ir 7 and Exh. A). 
Mr. Chamberlain prepared a written Order setting out the same 
representations as contained in Mr. Chamberlain's letter to the 
heirs and sent a copy of the Order to the heirs, except defendant. 
The Order was signed by the Probate Court. Defendant never filed 
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a single4 lawsuit against the heirs, yet Mr. Chamberlain 
eventually ended up with approximately 1/3 of the Fremont Ranch 
(640 acres). (See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, If 7 
and Exh. B). 
But for the representations of Ken Chamberlain, some of the 
heirs would not have agreed to file the civil lawsuits against 
Frank D. Gentry. (See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, 
« 12). 
During July 1989, defendant was staying with his sister, Ruby 
Jane (Gentry) Roberts. At that time, she discovered the 
representations made by Ken Chamberlain, on November 20, 1974, 
were false. To verify this information, Ruby Jane Roberts 
obtained a copy of the transcript of the probate hearing held on 
November 20, 1974. (See Affidavit of Ruby Jane (Gentry) Roberts, 
V I D . 
Defendant never wanted to sell his interest in the property 
and was forced out. (Tr. 127). Defendant never said or believed 
he owned all of the property and for the others to stay off. (Tr. 
126). 
After the partition sale in 1981, defendant refused to take 
the $21,833 for about 1-1/2 years until Ken Chamberlain and 
defendant's attorney Gunn McKay finally persuaded defendant to 
defendant's first complaint against the co-tenants and 
attorney Ken Chamberlain was prepared January 19, 1989 but 
subsequently not filed in light of trial counsel? s advice to 
defendant to agree, as part of his probation, not to pursue any 
civil action. (Tr. 182-183). 
5 
take it, Mr, McKay retained a portion for attorney's fees and the 
balance was used for improvements to the Fremont Ranch. (Tr. 124, 
127, 152). 
On or about April 23, 1986, Carlyle Stirling leased part of 
the Fremont Ranch for grazing from Frank and Curtis Gentry. (Tr. 
82). On April 23, 1986 Carlyle Stirling issued a check for 
$500.00 payable to defendant (Tr. 83, P-5). On June 23, 1986 
Carlyle Stirling issued a check in the amount of $100.00 to 
defendant (Tr. 85, P-10). On April 23, 1986, Carlyle Stirling 
issued a check for $200.00 to defendant. (Tr. 85). 
On November 10, 1986, Mack and Joseph Gentry, respectively, 
sold their 1/5 interest in the Fremont Ranch to Dan and Paul 
Roberts (brothers) who are sons to Mary Lou (G€*ntry) Roberts. 
(Tr. 20, 41, 72). 
On June 9, 1988, Constable Don Murdock certified he served a 
copy of a summons and complaint on Frank D. Gentry (R. 5). No 
complaint or information is attached to the summons filed with the 
court. 
On August 18, 1988, defendant Frank D. Gentry, represented by 
Earl F. Spafford, appeared at his preliminary hearing on the 
charge of Theft by Deception, a Third Degree Felony. Scott M. 
Burns, Iron County attorney, appeared on behalf of the State of 
Utah (R. 22). After witnesses testified, Judge Braithwaite found 
probable cause that defendant Frank D. Gentry committed the crime 
of Theft. On August 26, 1988 Judge Robert Braithwaite signed the 
6 
Bind Over Order requiring defendant Frank D. Gentry to appear at 
the Fifth District for arraignment on the crimes of Theft by 
Deception and Criminal Trespass (R. 25). 
On September 20, 1988, defendant Frank D. Gentry appeared at 
his arraignment wherein Judge J. Philip Eves, by interlineation, 
amended the Information, dated May 27, 1988 but not filed with the 
Fifth District Court until on August 30, 1988, to Theft, a Third 
Degree Felony. Judge Eves did not amend the information to 
reflect the correct statute defendant allegedly violated. (R. 26-
28). (There is no record that the charging Information was filed 
with the Court before August 30, 1988, which is four days after 
the preliminary hearing). 
On the same day of defendant's arraignment, September 20, 
1988, defendant Frank D. Gentry, by and through his counsel, 
reviewed and signed an Affidavit of Defendant on Arraignment which 
set forth the charge of Theft, a Third Degree Felony, and the 
punishment of a prison term of 1 to 15 years and a fine of 
$10,000. The affidavit did not set forth the alleged facts or 
elements of the offense but did indicate Mr. Gentry is 62 years 
of age and attended school through 12th grade. (R. 31-37). 
Scott Burns, Iron County attorney, signed the affidavit 
certifying that he had not improperly induced or coerced defendant 
to plead guilty. Defense counsel also certified that defendant 
understood the meaning of its contents and was mentally and 
7 
physically competent and all representations therein are accurate 
and true. (R. 31-37). 
Jury trial was scheduled for Wednesday, January 4, 1989. The 
jury trial was rescheduled to January 5, 1989 and again 
rescheduled for Wednesday, January 25, 1989 as reflected in the 
Fifth District Court's Notice dated January 5, 1989. (R. 45, 46, 
50). 
On January 25, 1989, the day of the jury trial, Scott M. Burns 
filed an Amended Information alleging Count I Theft, a Third 
Degree Felony, against Frank D. Gentry (R. 52). On that same day, 
defense counsel, Chase Kimball, filed a trial memorandum with the 
Court (R. 55-63). Mr. Kimball's Trial Brief specifically 
addressed the charge of Theft by Deception, a Third Degree Felony, 
rather than the amended charge of Theft, a Third Degree Felony. 
(R. 55). 
Even though defendant believed his case would be tried to a 
jury, no jury panel was present on January 25, 1989. (R. 141). 
However, Defendant Frank D. Gentry was sworn and questioned as to 
whether he waived his right to a jury trial. (Tr. 4-6). 
On April 6, 1989 defendant filed a motion and a supporting 
memorandum to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for preliminary 
hearing. In addition, defendant asserted that the underlying 
civil action is void and the conditions of probation violated his 
rights to pursue a civil remedy and to visit his father's grave. 
(R. 117-153). On August 24, 1989 defendant submitted a 
8 
supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw his 
plea, (R. 243-253). The trial court denied defendant's motion 
in its memorandum decision dated September 1, 1989 (R. 230-233, 
a copy is attached to Addendum B). 
On August 24, 1989, defendant filed a motion for new trial. 
On August 24, 1989, prior to the trial court issuing its 
memorandum decision, defendant filed a motion to disqualify the 
trial judge, supporting memorandum, affidavit of Frank Gentry and 
Certificate of Counsel. The trial court did not rule on 
defendant's motion for a new trial or to disqualify the trial 
judge. The trial court did not rule on the issue of whether the 
1981 civil judgment, which dispossessed defendant of his one-sixth 
interest in the Fremont Ranch is void. The trial court did not 
rule on the issues raised regarding defendant's probation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant was denied his right to an unbiased, impartial 
judge and a fair proceeding, a fundamental principle of due 
process, as a consequence of the trial judge's failure to recuse 
himself, which also precluded defendant from calling the judge as 
a witness. 
The trial court failed to rule on defendant' s motion for a new 
trial, which warrants the case be remanded for decision by a 
different district court judge. 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to theft, a third degree 
9 
felony, where (a) the court failed to explain to the defendant the 
facts and elements of the crime charged, (b) the record reveals 
the defendant had trouble hearing and understanding the 
proceedings, (c) the record reveals that defendant and his counsel 
were confused as to the crime charged and the plea bargain, and 
(d) the trial court did not adequately examine the defendant to 
determine if his plea of guilty was knowing and voluntary. 
Defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
His performance was prejudicial and deficient in the following 
areas: (1) Defense counsel failed to withdraw as to one 
defendant. A direct conflict of interest was presented when 
defense counsel called upon one defendant to plead guilty while 
charges were dismissed against the co-defendant; (2) defense 
counsel failed to assert valid defenses, call essential witnesses, 
and become familiar with the facts and the testimony of his own 
client; and (3) defense counsel should have moved to disqualify 
the trial judge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY NOT 
DISPOSING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY JUDGE PRIOR TO RULING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
PLEA. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides: 
If the . . . defendant . . . files an affidavit 
that the judge . . . has a bias or prejudice, 
10 
the judge shall proceed no further until the 
challenge is disposed of. 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-35-29(d) addresses the appropriate steps 
a challenged judge must take to dispose of the issue. 
If the challenged judge questions the 
sufficiency of the allegation of 
disqualification, he shall enter an order 
directing that a copy be forthwith certified to 
another named judge of the same court . . . , 
which judge shall then pass on the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations. If the 
challenged judge does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge 
to whom the affidavit is certified finds the 
affidavit to be legally sufficient, another 
judge shall be called to try the case or to 
conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified does not find the 
affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall 
enter a finding to that effect and the 
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or 
proceeding. 
Defendant submitted his affidavit, motion to disqualify judge, 
memorandum in support thereof, and certificate of counsel on 
August 24, 1989. The Fifth District Court stamped the above-
referenced documents "filed" August 28, 1989, three days prior to 
the Courtfs memorandum decision dated September 1, 1989 and filed 
September 5, 1989 (R. 215-234). However, the trial judge totally 
ignored defendant's motion to disqualify judge and the above-cited 
mandatory statutes and remained on the case to deny defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea. 
The cannons of judicial ethics clearly state that a judge 
should disqualify himself where his impartiality may be reasonably 
questioned, including but not limited to instances where: 
11 
(a) The judge has . . . personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts . . .; 
(b) The judge had served as lawyer in the 
matter in controversy, . . . or has been 
a material witness concerning it; 
See Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(a) and (b). 
The judge may, instead of withdrawing, disclose on the record 
or in writing the basis of his disqualification to which the 
lawyers and parties can all agree to waive the basis for 
disqualification and allow the judge to continue on the case. 
See Code of Judicial Conduct 3(D). In the instant case, the 
trial judge failed to disclose his involvement in the underlying 
transaction which now serves as the foundation for the criminal 
allegations against the defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
The general practice in this jurisdiction is 
for judges to disqualify themselves whenever an 
affidavit of bias or prejudice against them has 
been filed. As a general rule we think this is 
a commendable practice. 
The purity and integrity of the judicial 
process ought to be protected against any taint 
of suspicion to the end that the public and 
litigants may have the highest confidence in 
the integrity and fairness of the courts. 
Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948). 
The Haslam court stated that " . . . it is ordinarily better 
for judges to disqualify themselves even though he may be free of 
bias and prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of bias 
and prejudice." _Id. at 523. 
12 
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated that one of the 
fundamental principals of due process is that all parties to a 
case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. Fairness not 
only requires an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent 
even the possibility of unfairness. 
In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court quoted Justice Wade in his concurring opinion in the Haslam 
decision wherein he said: 
I can think of nothing that would as surely 
bring the courts into disrepute as for a judge 
to insist on trying a case where one of the 
litigants believes that such a judge is bias 
and prejudice against him. 
In Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1985), the Supreme 
Court held that: 
We have the utmost confidence in Judge Player? s 
ability to remain impartial despite his 
previous involvement with the Kniffens over ten 
years ago in a similar suit. The appearance of 
impropriety, however, compels us to order the 
assignment of another judge on remand. 
The trial court's failure to properly consider and dispose of 
defendant's motion to disqualify the judge not only reveals the 
appearance of impropriety but further taints defendantf s suspicion 
that the Court is prejudice. 
The defendant contends that the trial judge should not have 
ruled on defendantT s motion to withdraw his plea nor presided over 
the trial because the trial judge, while a practicing attorney, 
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represented the Beaver Valley Grazing Association in its bid to 
purchase the Fremont Ranch at the 1981 partition sale and was a 
witness to the actual sale. (R. 216). 
The Beaver Valley Grazing Association and other potential 
bidders, were excluded from the bidding process by attorney Ken 
Chamberlain at the first partition sale in 1978. (R. 220-221). 
To protect its interest at the second partition sale in 1981, the 
Beaver Valley Grazing Association retained the trial judge before 
he was appointed to the District Court (R. 215-216). 
The State's criminal case is based on the assumption that the 
defendant was legally disposed of his one-sixth interest in the 
Fremont Ranch at the 1981 partition sale and, therefore, he did 
not have legal authority to subsequently lease the ranch to 
others. The defendant believes the 1981 sale was void and thus 
it cannot serve as a foundation for the instant criminal charge 
of theft. (R. 217). 
To establish the sale is void, the defendant intends on 
calling as witnesses those present at the 1981 sales, including the 
trial judge and his client, the Beaver Valley Grazing Association. 
However, Rule 605 of the Utah Rules of Evidences precludes the 
judge presiding at the trial from testifying as a witness. No 
objection is necessary in order to preserve the issue. 
There is no way for defendant to obtain the information the 
trial judge possesses without calling the judge as a witness, 
cross-examining the trial judge, and questioning his client, all 
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of which raises substantial conflicts pointing to the conclusion 
the trial judge must be disqualified. 
Moreover, the defendant has no way of knowing if the trial 
judge relied on information from his former client or from being 
at the actual partition sale in 1981, when ruling on matters of 
law in defendant's criminal case. Even more troublesome, the 
trial judge was the factfinder in defendant's criminal trial. The 
defendant was always lead to believe his case would be tried to 
a jury until he arrived at court on January 25, 1989 and was 
requested to waive his right to a jury. In response to the 
request that he waive the jury and have the trial judge decide the 
facts, the following exchange took place: 
Mr. Spafford: And do you understand also that 
Judge Eves would have the 
additional responsibility of 
applying the law to the facts 
that he finds to exist? 
Mr. F. Gentry: Yes. 
Mr. Spafford: Now, are you satisfied with us 
proceeding in that fashion? 
Mr. F. Gentry: No. (Tr. 6 attached to Addendum 
C). 
Because of the change of directions by defendant's prior 
defense counsel, advising defendant to accept a plea bargain 
before a verdict was rendered by the court, the trial court did 
not have placed before it the decision to determine defendant's 
guilt or innocence. However, the trial judge went one step 
further and found the defendant guilty in response to defendant's 
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motion to withdraw his plea. (R. 233). Again, the issue of 
defendant's guilt or innocence was not before the trial judge. 
The trial judge's failure to recuse himself based on the 
appearance of bias and prejudice and being not only a witness but 
also a lawyer who represented a client wishing to dispossess 
defendant of his interest in the Fremont Ranch, substantially 
impacted defendantf s rights to a fair proceeding and warrants 
reversal of the trial judge's memorandum decision denying 
defendantf s motion to withdraw his plea and entitles defendant to 
a new trial presided over by an impartial District Court Judge. 
(See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (Repealed effective July 1, 
1990)). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
NOT DISPOS ING OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-24(a) provides "that a court may, upon 
motion of a party . . . , grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
Defendant served his speaking motion on August 24, 1989 
asserting that the 1981 partition sale is void, to which the 
Court has not heard testimony from all of the witnesses, and that 
the defendant is not guilty. The trial court did not rule on 
defendant's motion for a new trial. Therefore, defendant prays 
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that the case be remanded to a different district court judge for 
ruling on his motion for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY TO THEFT, 
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
A. DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY TO THEFT, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE. 
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the high court 
stated that a plea of guilty is not an intelligent voluntary 
admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant 
received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against 
him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due 
process." !Id. at 645, (cited in State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309, 
1312). 
1. The Trial Court Failed to Explain to the Defendant 
the Elements and Facts to the Crime of Theft Before 
Defendant Pled Guilty. 
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) the Supreme 
Court, in construing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, stated: 
that the factual elements of the charges 
against the defendant must be explained in the 
taking of the guilty plea so that defendant 
understands and admits those elements: because 
a guilty plea is an admission of all the 
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot 
be truly voluntary unless the defendant 
possesses the understanding of the law in 
relationship to the facts . . . . 
. . . The judge must determine that the conduct 
which the defendant admits constitutes the 
offense charged in the indictment or 
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information or an offense included therein to 
which the defendant has pleaded guilty, . . . 
There is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time of the 
plea is entered the defendants understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him. 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 466, 467, 470; (cited 
in State v. Gibbons at 1313). 
The pertinent parts of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(5) provides: 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty . . . and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
* * * 
the plea is voluntarily made; 
* * * 
the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering 
the plea, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements: 
* * * 
if the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
Rule 11(5) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that Constitutional and Rule 11(5) requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered. State v. Gibbons, 




In reviewing the transcript of Defendant's plea of guilty on 
January 25, 1989, the court totally failed to explain the 
elements of the crime and the relationship of the law to the 
facts as required under Gibbons and Rule 11. (Tr. 176-181). 
Moreover, the trial court failed to strictly comply with the 
rule. State v. Valencia, 766 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989); 
Accord State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988). 
The defendant did not understand the facts or elements of the 
crime to which he plead guilty. Moreover, defendant maintains 
that he is not guilty of theft. (R. 142). 
2. The Trial Court Erred By Relying On An Incomplete 
Record As a Substitute For Failing to Comply with 
Rule 11. 
The trial court concluded in its memorandum decision, denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, that the court did not 
explain the elements of the offense to the defendant during the 
change of plea nor determined a factual basis for entry of the 
plea of guilty because the defendant had been through a trial. 
(R. 230-233). 
The position now taken by the trial court is similar to the 
case of Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (filed August 22, 
1989), wherein the Supreme Court held that Rule 11 can be 
complied with if the whole record affirmatively establishes that 
the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences. Id. at 18. However, the 
trial court cannot presume from a silent or incomplete record 
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that the defendant understands the elements of the offense and 
the relationship of the law and the facts. State v. Valencia, 
776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989). 
Contrary to Jolivet, the whole record in the instant case 
supports defendant's motion to withdraw his plea because nowhere 
in the record does the court explain the elements and facts of 
the offense to the defendant to elicit defendantT s responses to 
determine if he understands the crime he is pleading to and that 
his admission is knowing and voluntary. Moreover, the following 
five examples demonstrate that not only was the defendant 
confused, but so was his counsel. 
First, defendant was originally charged with Theft by 
Deception and Criminal Trespass. However, according to the court 
records, the Information was not filed until August 30, 1989, 
four days after the preliminary hearing. (R. 26-28). 
Second, at the preliminary hearing, the State proceeded on 
the charge of Theft by Deception but the clerk indicated in the 
minutes that the defendant was bound over on a charge of Theft. 
However, Judge Braithwaite signed a bindover order dated August 
26, 1989, binding defendant over to the Fifth District Court on 
the charge of Theft by Deception. (R. 24, 25). 
Third, at defendant's arraignment on September 20, 1989, the 
court required defense counsel to fill out an Affidavit of 
Defendant on Arraignment. In the affidavit it states that 
defendant is charged with Theft, a Third Degree Felony. However, 
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defense counsel incorrectly listed the maximum penalty as 1 to 15 
years and the maximum fine as $10,000• The affidavit did not set 
forth the elements or facts to the crime of Theft (R. 31-37). 
Fourth, the defendant plead not guilty at this arraignment 
but the prosecutor signed the affidavit stating he had not 
coerced defendant to plead guilty, (R. 31-37). 
Fifth, further confusion is revealed on January 25, 1989, the 
day of defendant's trial. On that day defense counsel submitted 
their trial memorandum to the court. The trial memorandum 
incorrectly addressed the crime of Theft by Deception as opposed 
to the charge of Theft. (R. 55). The State finally filed its 
Amended Information, which alleges Theft, on January 25, 1989. 
3. The Defendant's Hearing Impairment. 
In addition to the foregoing, defendant, at trial, had a 
difficult time hearing the testimony and understanding what 
transpired. The trial court was made aware of defendant's 
hearing problem at the start of the trial. 
Mr. Kimball: Excuse me one second, your 
Honor, my client Frank Gentry is 
a little hard of hearing, so we 
may need sometimes to repeat 
things or to speak as loudly as 
possible. 
The Court: We'll certainly try to do that, 
can you hear me alright, Mr. 
Gentry? 
Mr. F. Gentry: Yes. I would appreciate if 
you'd talk slow and with a 
little more volume, please in a 
low tone. (Tr. 8 attached to 
Addendum D). 
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The record also reveals that at times during the trial the 
defendant was having difficulty hearing. (Tr. 126). More 
importantly, defendant did not adequately hear and understand the 
plea agreement presented to the court. Defense counsel and the 
trial court discuss the plea agreement for 2-1/2 pages explaining 
what the defendant will do. (Tr. 164-166). After defense 
counsel concluded explaining the agreement he asked defendant if 
he understands. 
Mr. Spafford: Now, may I ask Frank, if you 
understand what I said? 
Mr. F. Gentry: I have to say I couldn't hear it 
all, Earl. 
Mr. Spafford: All right. What I've done is 
repeated exactly what I told you 
in the hall* Did you understand 
that? 
Mr. F. Gentry: Yes. (Tr. 166 attached to 
Addendum D). 
There is no record of what was conveyed to the defendant in 
the hallway and whether he understood it. On March 8, 1989, 
defendant's trial counsel submitted a letter and his affidavit to 
the court stating the defendant did not fully understand the plea 
bargain and was having difficulty hearing5 on January 25, 1989. 
(R. 115, 152-153). The trial court has the burden to make sure 
the defendant understands the plea agreement before going 
5To verify defendant's hearing impairment, he was referred 
to a medical doctor for tests. Said test results and his doctor's 
letter are attached to Addendum D. 
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forward. (Rule ll(5)(f) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.) 
In response to his attorney's question whether he understands 
the agreement, the defendant starts questioning whether he can 
visit his father's grave on the Fremont Ranch, how to get his 
property, can he fly over the ranch, and whether he can drive on 
the road by the ranch. This goes on for 10 pages (Tr. 166-176). 
In contrast to its memorandum decision, the record reveals the 
trial court clearly recognized that the plea agreement was 
complicated and that defendant had a hearing problem but waited 
until after the agreement had been discussed for approximately 
12-1/2 pages before requesting the defendant to step forward to 
make sure he heard what the court said. (Tr. 174 attached to 
Addendum E). 
The Court: All right, Mr. Frank Gentry, 
will you come forward and stand 
up here by your attorney, 
please. Just stand right there. 
This is fine. Just stand right 
here close so I can talk to you, 
Frank. I want you to be in a 
position where you can hear me. 
(Tr. 176 attached to Addendum 
E). 
After the trial court finally had the defendant come closer 
to hear, it did not repeat what was discussed for 12-1/2 pages, 
what was discussed in the hall between defendant and his 
attorney, and no mention was made of the elements and facts to 
the crime to which he was asked to plead guilty. 
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4. The Trial Court Did Not Use An Affidavit. 
Even though the trial court required an affidavit at 
defendant's arraignment, no affidavit was utilized for defendant 
to plead guilty. Many courts rely on affidavits as a starting 
place to make sure the defendant knows and understands the 
elements and facts of the crime charged. 
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court said that a sufficient 
affidavit is a starting point but should not be an end point in 
the pleading process. A sufficient affidavit is one which is 
signed by the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the 
trial judge which lists the names and degrees of the crimes 
charged. 
The affidavit6 should contain both 
the statement of the elements of the 
offenses and synopsis of the 
defendants acts that establish the 
elements of the crimes charged. The 
affidavit should clearly state the 
allowable punishment for the crimes 
charged and should note that multiple 
punishments for multiple crimes may 
be imposed consecutively. . . . The 
details of any plea bargain should be 
set forth in the affidavit, as well 
as the disclaimer concerning any 
sentencing recommendations as 
required by Rule 11(e). (Emphasis 
added). Gibbons at 1313. . . . 
The trial judge should then review 
the statements in the affidavit with 
the defendant, question the defendant 
concerning his understanding of it, 
and fulfill the other requirements 
imposed by § 77-35-11 on the record 
6See R. 252 for a sample affidavit which sets out a section 
for "elements" and "facts." 
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before accepting the guilty plea. If 
a court does not use an affidavit, 
the requirements set forth above and 
in § 77-35-11 must still be followed 
and be on the record. (Emphasis 
added). Gibbons at 1314. 
"This procedure may take additional time, but constitutional 
rights may not be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy". 
Gibbons at 1314. 
The precise issue of whether defendantf s plea was made 
knowingly and voluntarily was addressed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988), 
(trial court failed to find defendant understood the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences), and by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 1266 
(Utah 1988) (remanded to trial court to determine exact 
recommendations, defendant's understanding of it, and the value 
of recommendations). In Vasilacopulos and Copeland, the 
respective courts concluded that the record did not support the 
requirement that the defendants understand what they are doing 
when pleading and reversed. 
In the instance case, the record reveals that the 
requirements enunciated in State v. Gibbons were not followed and 
therefore, Frank Gentry's plea must be withdrawn. 
25 
B. DEFENDANT AND DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE 
PLEA AGREEMMENT. 
Not until defendant retained present counsel did he realize 
he had been convicted of a felony by entering his plea. (R. 141-
142). 
Moreover, his prior counsel misunderstood the plea agreement 
and thought defendantf s plea was held in abeyance which he 
thought meant defendant is not convicted of a crime. (R. 150, 
153, 154). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial and effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
In Strickland, the court established a two prong test for 
analysis of the effective assistance of counsel. First, the 
Court required the defendant to show a deficiency in counsel's 
performance. The court defined "deficient performance" as that 
falling below an "objective" standard of reasonableness. The 
second prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show 
that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To prove prejudice, 
the defendant must show that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland at 694. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined prejudice as a reasonable 
likelihood that without counsel's error, a different result would 
have occurred. State v. Gray, 601 P. 2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979). In 
State v. Spear, 750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
court adopted the approach suggested in Strickland "if it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice. . . . " _Id. at 192. Accord, State 
v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
A. COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT IN THAT HE FAILED TO 
ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR TRIAL AND ASSIST DEFENDANT. 
1. Counsel Failed to Disqualify Himself As to One 
Defendant. 
Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
A lawyer shall not represent a client 
if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person or by the 
lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
the representation will not be 
adversely affected, and 
(2) each client consents after 
consultation. 
The general rule is that the lawyer in a criminal case should 
decline to represent more than one co-defendant and the court is 
generally required to raise the conflict issue when a lawyer 
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represents multiple defendants• (See Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rules of Professional Conduct, Comments to Rule 
1.7). 
In the instant case, both defendants were represented by the 
same lawyer at trial and through the plea bargain process. 
Although trial counsel may have reasonably believed both 
defendants had similar interests during the trial, those similar 
interests undisputedly dissipated when defense counsel called 
upon one defendant to plead guilty while the other defendant had 
the charges dismissed. 
The plea bargain agreement in this case clearly illustrates 
that two defendants in a criminal case cannot be represented by 
the same attorney. The court failed to address this issue even 
in light of defendant's reluctance to plead guilty. For example, 
after the court questioned the defendant as to whether he wanted 
to plead guilty to Count I, the following exchange took place: 
Mr. Spafford: I think you better. 
Mr. F. Gentry: Yes. (Tr. 177). 
As to the actual plea, the court asked how Mr. Gentry pleads: 
Mr. Spafford: Guilty. 
Mr. F. Gentry: Guilty. (Tr. 181). 
* * * 
The Court: Will you accept probation on those 
terms? 
Mr. F. Gentry: I have no alternative. (Tr. 186-
187). 
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Defendant's trial counsel has now submitted to the court his 
letter and affidavit stating that he believes the defendant did 
not understand the plea agreement. If defendant had the 
assistance of separate and independent counsel to advise him 
whether to accept or reject the plea agreement, the result in 
this case would have been different. 
2. Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate The Facts, 
Witnesses and Valid Defenses. 
The two valid defenses in this case are defendant's lack of 
intent to commit a theft and his collateral attack on the 1981 
Partition sale as being void, thus, having no legal force or 
effect. However, trial counsel asserted the theories of adverse 
possession and prescriptive easement, defenses that are totally 
without merit given the instant facts. 
It is clear from the record that defendant did not pay the 
taxes on the Fremont Ranch during the claimed period of adverse 
possession. (Tr. 147). Thus, a claim for adverse possession 
fails. Neeley v. Relsch, 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979); Accord 
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
More obvious than defendant not paying the Fremont Ranch 
taxes as required to establish adverse possession, is the fact 
that defendant was a tenant-in-common with relatives. 
Defense counsel, without question, should have been aware of 
Massey v. Prothero, 664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983), as it is cited in 
the Notes to Decisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7, which is the 
Adverse Possession statute. 
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In Massey, the court held that co-tenant's acts must be more 
than simple acts of possession, maintenance, paying taxes, making 
improvements on the property, fencing the land and farming the 
land to establish adverse possession. _Xd. at 1180. Before a 
tenant-in-common can begin to establish adverse possession 
against another co-tenant, the one in possession, must, either by 
speech or by acts of "the most open and notorious character, " 
clearly show that his possession is intended to exclude the 
rights of the other co-tenants. McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 
Utah 388, 126 P. 316, 320 (Utah 1917). Defendant testified he 
never claimed to own all of the property or to exclude the other 
co-tenants.7 (Tr. 126). 
Even though the Utah Supreme Court will not second-guess an 
attorney's legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial tactics or 
strategy, the defense of adverse possession relied on by defense 
counsel clearly demonstrates his ineffective and deficient 
performance. See State v. McNicol, 554 P. 2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1976). 
Had defense counsel advanced the defenses of lack of intent 
to commit a theft or that the partition sale is void, which the 
facts and testimony support, and called the appropriate 
7Where the co-tenants are close relatives, as in the case at 
hand, even the lapse of forty years is insufficient to establish 
adverse possession. Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 57, 404 P. 2d 
253, 257 (Utah 1965). 
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witnesses,8 the state could not have proven defendant's guilt 
Defense counsel should have called as witnesses, the Beaver 
Valley Grazing Association, Judge J. Philip Eves, Ron Bradshaw, 
Bryan Hafen, and Mitchell Schoppman to establish that the 1979 and 
1981 partition sale was void. Moreover, defense counsel should 
have submitted evidence that would show defendant made 
improvements to the Fremont Ranch with the lease money as he has 
done for the past twenty years, without incident. Thus defendant 
had no intent to deprive the other owners. 
Furthermore, trial counsel failed to make a clear record as 
to the prior litigation between defendant and his brothers and 
sisters. The record refers to the partition sale of 1981. 
However, the prior litigation was commenced and captioned as 
follows: 
Mack R. Gentry, Joseph F. Gentry, Mary Lou Roberts, Ruby Jane 
Roberts, Glenda S. Hawley, for herself and as the surviving wife 
and administrator of the estate of William Larry Gentry, deceased, 
William Larry Gentry and Andrea Breinholt, plaintiffs v. Frank D. 
Gentry, et al., defendants, Civil No. 6763, filed on March 7, 1975 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, Utah. 
The 1975 civil lawsuit was filed in response to Ken 
Chamberlain's material misrepresentations of what took place at 
the probate hearing on November 20, 1974. Because of those 
representations, defendant's brothers and sisters, unbeknownst to 
defendant, agreed to give 1/4 of the Fremont Ranch to Ken 
Chamberlain to recover their interest in the ranch. Ken 
Chamberlain did not disclose his ownership to the Court when the 
Court ordered the property sold. 
Acting not only as counsel for co-tenant plaintiffs, but also 
as a silent owner of part of the property to be sold, Ken 
Chamberlain advised and consented to postponement of the 
judicially-ordered Sheriff's sale to allow Bryan Hafen to buy the 
ranch for $368,000, almost $100,000 more than the appraisal value 
of December 14, 1977 and almost 18 times the value established in 
1974 at the probate of Ivy Jane Erickson's Estate. 
Bryan Hafen did not meet the established deadline so Ken 
Chamberlain filed in the Fifth District Court of Iron County, on 
February 10, 1978, a document entitled Order of Sale, ordering the 
Fremont Ranch to be sold at a public auction on March 14, 1978 at 
12 o'clock noon at the steps of the Iron County Courthouse in 
Parowan, Utah. Several bidders appeared at the sale, however, 
only Bryan Hafen was allowed into a closed room to negotiate with 
Ken Chamberlain. Without disclosing his interest in the Fremont 
(continued...) 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. COUNSELTS PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT IN THAT HE FAILED TO 
MOVE TO DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
As discussed in Point I of this brief at pp. 10-16, the trial 
judge, while a practicing attorney, represented a client who 
attempted to dispossess defendant of his one-sixth interest in 
the Fremont Ranch at the 1981 partition sale. The state's case 
is premised on the assumption that the 1981 sale lawfully 
dispossessed defendant of his interest in the ranch. Defendant 
disputes the validity of the 1981 partition sale. The trial 
judge witnessed the 1981 sale. 
(...continued) 
Ranch, Ken Chamberlain had Bryan Hafen agree to buy his clients' 
five-sixths interest in the Fremont Ranch for $300,000. As part 
of this transaction, Ken Chamberlain required defendant to 
mortgage his one-sixth interest through a series of questionable 
events. Bryan Hafen could not obtain a loan and defaulted which 
prompted Ken Chamberlain to file a suit on behalf of defendant's 
brothers and sisters against Bryan Hafen and defendant to 
foreclose on the mortgage. That lawsuit was captioned Mack 
Gentry, et al. v. Bryan Hafen, Frank D. Gentry, et al., Civil No. 
7948. Of interest, Ken Chamberlain and his partner, Tex Olsen, 
were listed as plaintiffs. The default judgment was set aside. 
In 1981, the Fifth District Court ordered a third sale of the 
Fremont Ranch. The Beaver Valley Grazing Association had appeared 
at the prior sale to bid on the property but Ken Chamberlain did 
not allow them to bid. Therefore, Beaver Valley Grazing 
Association retained J. Philip Eves to represent its interest at 
the 1981 sale. 
At the 1981 sale, bids were made. Defendant's brothers and 
sisters credit bid their interest and bought the Fremont Ranch 
paying defendant approximately $22,000 which he refused to take. 
Ken Chamberlain ended up with Parcel C, 640 acres. Defendant has 
strenuously objected to the validity of the sale and continually 
tried to halt the sale to preserve his one-sixth interest. 
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Predicated on Rule 605 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the 
appearance of bias or prejudice, defendants trial counsel should 
have moved to disqualify the trial judge. Trial counelfs failure 
to move to disqualify the trial judge precluded defendant from 
calling the judge and his client as witnesses to collaterally 
establish that the 1981 partition is void. Moreover, defendant's 
right to a fair trial by an impartial judge was totally 
disregarded by his prior counsel's failure to disqualify a judge 
who represented a client who attempted to dispossess defendant of 
his interest in the Fremont Ranch. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, defendant seeks 
reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the District 
Court for dismissal of the charge or in the alternative a new 
trial presided over by a different judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /** day of December, 1989 
GEORGE\&. WADDSUPST J 2 
of and for 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, George Waddoups, hereby certify that seven copies of the 
foregoing were hand delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102, and four 
copies were hand delivered to the Attorney General's Office, R. 
Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, this /U- day of December, 1989. 
Delivered by v^»/»r»j UaeldbUfA this day of December, 19 89, 
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ADDENDUM A 
GEORGE T. WADDOUPS, (#3965) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
RUBY JANE (GENTRY) ROBERTS 
vs. : 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, : Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendant,. : Criminal No. 1232 
STATE OF MONTANA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF FERGUS ) 
RUBY JANE (GENTRY) ROBERTS, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am a resident of Fergus County, State of Montana, 
over the age of twenty-one (21) and make this affidavit based upon 
my personal knowledge. 
2. By consanguinity, I am a sister to the defendant Frank 
Gentry and a daughter to Milton H. Gentry and Ivy Jane (Erickson) 
Gentry, both deceased. 
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3. I presently own a one-fifth interest, as a tenant in 
common, in the Fremont Ranch in Iron County, Utah. 
4. That Ken Chamberlain was engaged to make sure the estate 
of Milton H. Gentry and the estate of Ivy Jane Erickson were 
properly probated. 
5. That Ken Chamberlain mailed a letter dated November 20, 
1974 to Joseph F. Gentry, Mack R. Gentry, Mary Lou Roberts, Ruby 
Jane Roberts, and Glenda S. Hawley stating that Frank D. Gentry 
appeared at the Ivy Jane (Erickson) Gentry estate probate hearing 
on November 10, 1974, claiming 100% interest in the her estate and 
the Milton H. Gentry estate and that he is entitled to all of the 
property. 
6. Mr. Chamberlain stated in his November 20, 1974 letter 
that there would be three lawsuits (1) one in the Ivy Jane 
(Erickson) Gentry estate, (2) one in the Milton H. Gentry estate, 
and (3) a partition action if the judge decides Frank Gentry is 
not entitled to all of the claimed interests (See Exhibit A). 
7. Mr. Chamberlain stated unless he prevails or makes some 
recovery for us no fee will be assessed. Mr. Chamberlain stated 
he needed 1/4 of the Fremont Ranch to undertake our representation 
but ended up with 1/3 of the Fremont Ranch, approximately 640 
acres. Frank D. Gentry never filed a single lawsuit. I was under 
the impression we had to defend his claims. 
8. Mr. Chamberlain mailed me a copy of the Court's Order 
which included the representations Mr. Chamberlain claimed Frank 
D. Gentry had made at the probate hearing. (See Exhibit B). 
9. Based on Mr. Chamberlain's representations and the Court 
Order which stated that Frank D. Gentry claimed 100% interest in 
the property, I agreed to take legal action to defend my 
interests. 
10. During August 1989, Frank D. Gentry came to visit me in 
Montana. While Frank was visiting, I told him that I and some of 
the other heirs would not have taken legal action to protect our 
interests had he not claimed total ownership of the Fremont Ranch 
at the probate hearing in 1974. As always, Frank D. Gentry denied 
saying this. I brought up Mr. Chamberlain's letter and the 
Court's Order. Frank D. Gentry recommended that I read the 
November 20, 1974 transcript of the probate hearing. 
11. Since our conversation in August, 1989, I have obtained 
a copy of the transcript of the probate hearing and learned that 
Frank D. Gentry was telling the truth and that Mr. Chamberlain had 
apparently stated his comments in error or fabricated them (See 
Exhibit C). 
12. I have since discovered that Mr. Chamberlain prepared the 
Order for the court to sign which included inaccurate information 

















not have agreed to initiate legal action to dispossess my brother, 
Frank D. Gentry, of his one-sixth interest in the Fremont Ranch. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 1989. 
iwk. L \ \ J ""T~~ V 1 " ; 
RUBY JANE ^GENTRY) ROBERTS 
NOVEMBER 
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Lewistown 
My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s : 
Q9-24-9Q 
4 
LAW O F F I C E S 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. O L S E N
 7 6 S O U T H M A I N T E L E P M O N E 
K E N C H A M B E R L A I N « . , . „ . , • , „ , « . * « . ^ w « S a a - « * a i 
RICHFIELD, UTAH §4701 
November 20, 1974 
Joseph F. Gentry 
Mack R. Gentry 
Mary Lou Roberts 
Ruby Jane Roberts 
Glenda S. Hawley 
Dear Folks: 
At the probate hearing held this morning Frank Gentry 
and his wife and two oldest boys appeared and lodged a formal 
personal objection to all further probate proceedings and to the 
Decree of Distribution and asked that the Administrators, Mack R. 
Gentry and Joseph F. Gentry be discharged and that the entire estate 
be awarded to Frank Gentry because of the "30 years'1 which he states 
he has spent on the property. 
Frank stated that he had engaged the services of an attorney, 
Patrick H. Fenton of Cedar City, Utah to represent him in this law-
suit. 
The Judge gave Mr. Fenton two weeks within which to file 
written protests and then will set the case for trial one month from 
now for a certain time to be decided at the second Law and Motion 
Day in December, 1974. 
Frank also is claiming thathe has now acquired a 100 per 
cent Interest in the Milton H. Gentry estate and that he is entitled 
to all of the property and also entitled to a lien on it for approx-
imately $30,000.00 for his personal services. We are going to have 
three lawsuits: 
(1) The one in the Ivy Erickson Gentry estate here in 
Sevier County. 
(2) The one in Iron County for the estate of Milton 
H. Gentry, and 
(3) The partition action which will divide the property 
out if the Judge should decide that Frank is not going to be entitled 
to all of the interests as he claims he is. 
t - w o r r i c e s 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
RICHFIELD. UTAH 84701 
- 2 -
In this regard it is necessary for us to have a firm 
agreement with you concerning our legal representation of you. You 
will need to be adequately represented in this case to counter 
against Frank's claim to be asserted by his attorney, that he has 
acquired undisputed total entitlement to the property. 
These three lawsuits will be time consuming and complicated 
for our office. In addition to that we will have a fee coming for 
probate of the Ivy Erickson Gentry estate which we have not billed 
as yet. 
We have previously discussed taking this case on a contingent 
fee basis and the only ^ay we would be interested in assuming these crr^ 
complicated lawsuits Wuuiu be on a contingent tee of one-fourth (l/4y 
of the property re<- ^red. Ultimately, as you will see from the 
enclosed form of rec ler, "Retainer for Legal Services11 the fees are 
one-third (1/3) but we will be willing to accept this case on a one-
fourth basis provided it is agreeable with all of the heirs. 
I am enclosing a form fcr each of you to sign and a return-
addressed, stamped envelope for you to return if the Retainer \greement 
is satisfactory to you. 
You will notice from the Retainer Agreement that unless we 
prevail or make some recovery for you no fee will be payable to us. 
We anticipate that our services to date in defending the 
lawsuit brought by Morgan Barlow against the heirs and against the 
prorerty, in probating the Ivy Erickson Gentry estate, and the collective 
work in the Milton H. Gentry estate would run approximately $5,000.00 
with our expenses. All of that would be a part of the Retainer Agree-
ment as well as work we will do in the future which will be several 
times that which we have already done. 
If this appears satisfactory to you, please sign and return 
tt.e enclosed Retaiuei Agreement in ti«e scanipeu, r«s;:u«.n-&aarei>i»ed envelope. 
Yours very truly, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
\* 
By ^ ~ ~ - ^ 3. U i i ^ - -
tan CfcMb«ffl«ln 
KC:gln 
I i •—, ( ' . / v_ 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
ATTORNEYS F O P AnMTWTSTBATnpg 
76 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
RICHFIELD. UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
NO. JA3.* :•• LED 
r-Ov 2M974 
DEVON P0UJ30N, C'3rk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, PROBATE DIVISION, OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
OF ) 
IVY JANE ERICKSON GENTRY, also 
known as IVY JANE ERICKSON, 
Deceased, 
O R D E R 
Probate No. 3230 
The above entitled matter came on before the Court on the 
First and Final Account and Report of Administration and Petition 
for Decree of Final Distribution of Joseph F. Gentry and Mack R. 
Gentry, Administrators of the Estate of Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry,, 
also known as Ivy Jane Erickson, deceased; 
The Court FINDS that due, legal and timely notice upon 
said Account, Report and Petition was given to the persons, for 
the time and in the manner provided by law and as ordered by 
the Court; 
At said hearing Frank D. Gentry appeared and objected to 
the entry of a Decree of Distribution, requested that the Admini-j 
strators be discharged and that an Administrator from Beaver 
County and one from Sevier County be appointed in substitution 
and asserted that he had a claim to all of the property sought 
to be distributed and that the other heirs had no interest 
-2-
Whereupon the Court was advised that the objector, Frank 
D. Gentry, was represented by Patrick H. Fenton, Esquire, of 
Cedar City who could not attend the hearing and who requested 
time within which to make a formal appearance and file objec-
tions; whereupon Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for the Administrato] 
agreed that Mr. Frank D. Gentry and his legal counsel be allowec 
two weeks within which to file formal written objections to the 
Account, Report and Petition for Final Distribution and that the 
matter be continued for one month or until the second Law and 
Motion Day in December (the 18th day of December, 1974) at whici 
time the Court will determine what issues, if any, are presentee 
by the written objections and protests and, if any issues are 
presented, then the matter will be set for trial.. If no issues 
are presented, the Court will rule upon the Account, Report and 
Petition for Decree of Distribution at the second Law and Motioi 
Day in December or as soon thereafter as the Court determines 
appropriate; 
The Court ORDERS that Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for the 
Administrators, give notice of this ruling by mailing a copy of 
this Order to the Protestant personally and to his Attorney, 
Patrick H. Fenton, and to all of the other heirs at law of the 
decedent so that any person who wishes to file formal written 
objections to the Account, Report, and Petition for Final Distr: 
bution of the Administrators, may do so which filing must be mac 
within two weeks from date hereof or on or before the 4th day oJ 
December, 1974. 
"DATED-5HIS 20fk DAY OF DECEMBER*. 1974. 
DON^Vw T I p S , DISTRICT JUDGfc 
LUKilirlCATE OF SER^fE 
SERVED the within and foregoing Order upon the following ' 
by mailing a full, true, and correct copy thereof, U. S. Mail, 
Postage Prepaid, this 20th day of November, 1974: 
Mr. Frank D. Gentry, 307 North Third West, 
Richfield, Utah (84701) 
Mr. Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney for Protestant, 
Frank D. Gentry, Attorney at Law, Cedar City, Utah 
Mr. Joseph F. Gentry, 190 West First North, 
Richfield, Utah (84701) 
Mr. Mack R. Gentry, 240 West First North, 
Richfield, Utah(84701) 
Mrs. Mary Lou Roberts, 165 North 1225 West, 
Cedar City, Utah (84720) 
Mrs. Ruby Jane Roberts, Route #1, Box #88, 
Wadsworth, Illinois (60083) 
Mrs. Glenda S. Gentry, Monroe RFD, Utah 
William Larry Gentry, 137 Brooks Parkway, 
San Antonio, Texas (78214) 
Andrea Mack, Richfield, Utah 
Ken Chamberlain 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0? SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE CF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER Op THE ESTATE 
OF 
IVY JANE ERICKSON GENTRY/ 
a l s o known as IVY JANE 
ERICKSON, 
Deceased# 
PROBATE NO. 3230 
TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled 
action came before the Court sitting without a jury on 
Wednesday, the 20th day of November, 197^, at the hour of 
i 
10:00 O'clock A. M., before zhe Honorable Don V. Tibbs, ! 
District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District of the State
 : 
of Utah in and for Sevier County, in the Courtroom of the ! 
Sevier Couaty Courthouse as Richfield, Sevier County, State! 
of Utah. ! 
i 
L 2 2 I i 2 LI 2L 1 ! 
;-:en Chamberlain j 
01sen & Chamberlain j 
A"orneys at Law 
75 South Main j 
Richfield, Utah 84701 ! 
FOR THE ESTATE 












THE COURT: This Is in the matter of 
the Estate of Ivy Jane Erickson Gentry, also known as ivy 
Jane Erickson, deceased. I notice Mr, Chamberlain is the i 




 MR. CKA;>3ERLAIN: That's right, Your Honor. 
6
 ITm attorney for the petitioners asking for approval of 
' the First and Final Account and Report of Administration 
8
 and petition for Decree of Final Distribution. 
9| THE COURT: What is the situation, 
Counsel? 
MR. CHA'lEEEI^IN: Just a petition distri-
Gentry 
buting the interest of Ivy Jane Erickson/in certain real 
property in Iron County, Utah, to the heirs at lav/. S'ae 
died without a will and -.:e!re asking that it be divided 
equally among her cr.ilcrcn. 
THE COURT: Is there any one present 
1*1 in Court who has any objection to the First and Final 
*8| Account and Petition for Decree of Final Distribution'' 
191 MR. FRANK GENTRY: Your Honor. 
20) THE COURT: Will you identify your 
name for the record? 
MR. FRANK GENTRY: ITm Frank Gentry, one of 
the heirs and the son of Ivy Gentry and if I!m permitted 
-*j the time I'd like to clear up a few things and ask a number 
•
5
 of questions or ask the privilege to have this matter 
-
6| postponed until my attorney and my counsel can make an 
examination and investigation and submit to you a formal 
report. 
* * r* 29 THE COURT: '-^o is your attorney, ^ 
to tha t . ; 
matter of 
to be any 
!r. Chamberlain? 
KR. CHAMBERS:: 
fact what I 'd iik-
objection, as the 
from the f i l e , th i s is an ii 
asking thac the property be 
•I: No, Your Honor 
2 to do is i f there 






Court can very c lear ly observe 
i t e s t a t e probate where we1re 


















law. The heirs are set forth in.the petition. We have no 
objection at all to him cAfcing any inquiry or investiga-
tion he desires ;o make; however, I would prefer to have 
-he matter set on the trial calendar. I would like a date 
certain zez for the trial of the? r,-ttter and I'd like ~o 
Mi. GSKTRY: Mr* ?at Fenton. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection 






13- '-Tour Honor fi:: a day within which they can file a;:y •. .••itten 
protests or objections to the Petition and that c!.:ul; be 
it least ten dayc prior to the tir.i of the trial, t;...i. I'd 
like this matter set on the trial calendar so it can \z 
dettenr.ir.sd. 
IKE COURT: Have you talked to Mr. 
Fenton, Kr. Gentry? 
KR. GENTRY: Yes, I have ensued Kr. 
Fenton. He couldn't ba her* because of a conflict. 
THE COURT: This is what I1 lido: I111 
continue the natter for a period of two weeks until the 
next Law and Motion Day. I111 give you ten days in order 
to have Kr. Fenton examine this file and make any objec-
tion thatt he has. 
KR. GENTRY: vvhat I'd like the Court 




THE COURT: Well — 
MH« CHAMEZRLA;LT: Year Honor, in order t o 
. r e c o m m i t ? Ilr* Gentry >:1>J ic rr.cl.l^ a p e r ^ o n d ap^a.!'6rtce' 
to object :o the Account, P.opcrt and Peti t ion for D i s t r i -
bution, could we have an crder to the effect that written 
or 
4 [ objections, that is whatever written objection/ protests 
5 that they wish to interpore to th is pet i t ion wil l be ; 
a\ f i led no l a t e r than two v;ecks from today and that th i s 
j 
matter will be held on lev; m i :•:•;• tion calendar next follow- j 





!2J I'S. GSOTRY: Z ZL£a*t hear him. 
13 THE COURT: :;-. e the r words I<d l i k e 
THE COURT: "o you have any objec t ion 
t o t h a t ? 
t o have your w r i t t e n objee:. . . ; . . i l e d on or before tfcs ::2xt 
Law and not ion Day which ::. ^ ' ; rcclrs f r e e today and t h a t 
mat ter w i l l be continued ur.cil the fol lowing Law and .'lotion 





19 if you file a written objection. How, frankly, that is 
20j more than fair and so if you1re coins to go talk to Mr. 
21 | Fenton, please understand that is more than fair and he can 
get a copy of this file or the papers in the file for the 
purpose of making an objection within that period of time. 
So, do you understand what I'm doing now? 






271 TEE COURT: Alright. 




THE COURT: You may surely. 

















to have the court appoint two Administrators that are in 
this faraiiy? 
T*fK cmn?T: I?t r.o juat ace « ^s-
already been an Administrator appointed. 
KR. CHAMBERLAIN: in fact there are two 
Administrators who are asking, 
sI MR. GENTRY: Your Honor, I feel that 
si these two have never conversed with me. They are biased; 
they are prejudiced; and I would like to ask' the Court 
to issue an appointment of an administrator, one from 
Sevisr County here and the other from Beaver County. 
This is thirty years of zy work that's involved. 
12 i Ts^ COURT: M r . Gentry, let r.e just 
13J explci.i something: I hava heretofore appointed two 
adminirtr&tors. They havs worked with this estate. Tnc-y 
have ,c:-:pleted every—in- chat is to be done in tie csts.se. 
They are now asking tha Court to approve what they have 
finally done and they are raying that the estate 13 
19| ^ady to be distributed. My point is when you ask me to 
20 appoint two new administrators what would be the purpose of 
21 that? 
2 2
 KR, GENTRY: Well, can they be dls-
23 
qualified? 
THE COURT: Listen to me a minute: 
They are telling me that they have completed everything 
2 7| and that it is ready to be distributed. 
2B KR. GENTRY: But they've never talked 
291 to me. 
THE COURT: That I don't know and, of 

























need to t e l l you that . ;/hat I'n* crying i s you have a 
right t o see what they have done and you have a right to 
r<tl* ?" obJ*cticn to vhst thoy'v: ions i f you think t ; ^ T 
done something wrong. You can bri::g i t to ay at tent ion 
and I w i l l then determine that . Do you see what I mean, 
4 I i f there i s something that they've done wrong? 
51 MR. GENTRY: That's f ine . 
J 
6i raE COURT: But I don't want to tell 
you that I'm going to appoint semeone else when they tell 
ce -hat everything has been done and they are ready to 
divide it up among the members of the family. Do you 
. .lie:: what I'm saying? So, cy advice to you is that you 
.i:!'.• to Mr. ?-anton, have him go ever this account, have 
ever 
..:::-. ;c/everything they've done in this natter, and if r.z 
- -13 that they have done something wronr ir if he feels. 
uhat t:c:r.ethins is wrong wish this accounting, then he Lz 
to file what is known as an objection and bring it to cy 
attention and I will find cut if there is something wrong 
or if there isn't something wrorv; and I don't want to get 
2aj the cart before the horse, if you follow me. So, what I 
21 ! will do is this: This is the Order that I'm going to make: 
22 I ' l l continue t h i s matter for the period of one month, then 
without further not ice , and I w i l l allow you or the other 
he irs the period of two weeks to f i l e written objections 
t o t h i s accounting, that i s , tne f ina l accounting of the 
271 Pet i t ion for Final Dis tr ibut ion, s e t t i n g forth within that 
23 period of two weeks what i s wrong with i t . 
VR. GE2J7RY: Alr ight . 
THE COURT: Now, a copy of t h i s written 
object ion w i l l he sew^H nnr>n h*~ f-fcmhdTOain who ranre-
scats the Administrators of this estate, so he has notice 
of what they're objecting, so he can find out if there'3 
something reang in <•>?.*» •-» -*-•-«•
 r.-t I^PAI *\..•_.»'. :^  „>.j :.:\' i1.^  
wrong. So, he likewise will have an opportunity to talk j 
to his clients. Then four weeks fresi that time this r.atter i 
will be back before the Court and I'm instructing ay 
Clerk to bring it back before the Court and it will coze 
61 before me at that time. Now, zz that time, you will have, 
7| both of you, an opportunity to fee h:,ard. If there's some-
thing wrong and I feel that thera chould be additional 
time given, I will set up addi"i:v" 1 time where you both 
can present your ideas. After 1 L:.:': r/.-sr the objections 
and any answer to the objeccic: *. ••.: :? I determine 
that in case there's nothing wri:. ... '..-r* I'll make an 
141 order that I feel is necessary. 
15| EX. GZlTZKi: I " I ask one more ques-
tion? 
THE COURT: Ysu aay. 
MR. G2NTRJT: T/.is property is In Iron 











21 over here or over there? 
22 THE COURT: IJo, this will be held here. 
231 I assume she died here. 
KR. CHAK3ERLAIN: The decedent died here and 
was a resident of Sevier County. 
THE COURT: If the decedent was a 
24 
25 
2 6 J 
271 
2s resident of this county at the time of her death, that's 
29 j where the proceedings should be held regardless of where 
30! the land is. 
I _ _ _ _ _ 
II a half and two thirds of this is in my father's estate in 
2 Iron County so I was Just wondering what held priority. 
3 MR. CHAMBERLAIN: The estate of yoir father 
4 has been fully administered and a Decree of Distribution • 
5 entered in Iron County. 
6 THE COURT: Is this your mother, Ivy 
7 Gentry? 
8 MR. GENTRY: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: Well, of course, in a 
10 probate of a person's estate, the only estate you are 
11 dealing with is that which that person owns. If she 
12 ov/ned one-third or one-tenth or one-thirtieth, that's what 
13 we've got to probate. 
U MR. GENTRY: Well, we maintain, Judge, 
15 that my mother was settled with before and she received the 
16 house and furnishings and that was all taken care of. 
17 Now, there's a lot of things so be brought into light but 
13 we will go into that later. 
19 THE COURT: That's what Mr. penton will 
20 have to bring to my attention. As far as I know they are 
21 listing this as the property she owned at the time of her 
22 death and that is something that Mr. Fenton can bring to 
23 my attention in the forming of an objection. 
24 MR.GENTRY: This is very important to 
25 us. This represents thirty years of work out there. This 
26 is our home and the other heirs chose to come home and I 
27 remained out there and now tney want to split it up 
28 equally and there are a couple of liens against this 
29 estate too. 
ifrI THE COURT- Ms?. C e n t r a of course . 7 
don't want to get into that at this tir.2. 
MR. GENTRY: I see. 
THE COURT: Everything that comes 
before this Court is very important, so you understand. 
MR. GENTRY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Everything that comes 
before this Court is extremely important or it wouldn't 
be here, and, of course, what we're trying to do is what 
is risht. I am sure if you talk to your attorney and go 
over thi s matter with him he will advise you of what he 
thinks is right and if he feels that an objection should be 
filed, I am sure he will do so and if Mr. Chamberlain, who 
represents these people, wishes to answer and denies what 
Mr. r-.:ron files, I will take that into consideration too 
ani I -r. the one who will decide in the long run. Okeh? 
MR. GENTRY: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I will assure you that I 
will do what I think is right. 
MR. GENTRY: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: It is the Order that this 
matter is continued for one month on the second Law and 
Motion Day frota this date, that any one of the heirs have 
a right to file a written objection with the period cf two 
weeks, copy of which should be served on Mr. Chamberlain, 
so he can make any answer he desires and I will hear the 
matter four weeks from today. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: If you will notify Mr. 
penton accordingly that he will not receive any further 
notice of this. 
MR. GENTRY: Alright. 
THE COURT: The matter is continued and 
3I will go on the calendar four weeks from today. Will you 
4 prepare an Order in conformity with what I have stated, Mr. 
5 Chamberlain? 
61 MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I shall, and I shall submit 
it to the Court sometime today. 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
I, C. HOWARD WATKIN, do hereby certify that I am a duly 
licensed and registered Certified Court Reporter and that at the 
time of the hearing herein I was the Sixth District Court Reporter 
for the State of Utah; 
I further certify that I was present in the Courtroom of 
the Sevier County Courthouse at Richfield, Sevier County, State of 
Utah, on the 20th day of November, 1974 at the hour of 10:00 O'clock 
A.M., at the hearing held in the matter entitled, "In the Matter of 
the Estate of Iva Jane Erickson Gentry, also known as Iva Jane 
Erickson, Probate #3230," before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth 
Judicial District Judge of the State of Utah, sitting without a jury; 
I further certify that the within and foregoing represents a 
full, true, and accurate report and transcript of the record in that 
matter as requested to be transcribed; 
DATED THIS '3 DAY OF " (rLr^' , 19 £~? 
_ C. HOWARD V^ATKIN, C.S.R. 
Richfield, Utah (84701) 
0094B 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DTSTPICT COURT CF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FCR THE COUNTY OF I PON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, 
Defendant. y 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Criminal No. 1232 
This natter cane on before the above-entitled Court, the 
Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, for trial to the bench on 
January 25th, 1989. The Defendant had previously waived his right 
to a trial by jury through counsel and repeated that waiver in 
open Court at the commencement of the trial. The Court heard the 
evidence in t^e CELSQ in full and took a brief recess orior to 
bearing closing arguments of counsel. During that recess, counsel 
for the defense and counsel for the prosecution were able to 
discuss the case and approached the Court with a proposal for a 
plea agreement which would involve dismissal of the charges 
against Curtis Gentry, a co-defendant, and dismissal of one of t'^ e 
charges against Frank David Gentry in exchange for his plea of 
guilty to one Third Degree Felony and contained certain other 
terms. 
Thereafter a chance of plea was taken on the record by 
the Court in accordance with the terms agreed to by the partier. 
In view of the fact that the case had been fully tried the Court 
did not explain the elements of the offense to the Defendant 
during the change cf plea nor was there any factual basis 
determined for the entry of the plea since the Defendant had been 
present throughout the trial and was well aware of the evidence 
which had been admitted and the charges against him. 
The Court took the Defendant's plea cf guilty to one 
Third Degree Felony offense cf Theft, having heard the evidence in 
the case and having made its own determination that the evidence 
supported a conviction of the Defendant for that offense as well 
as the Criminal Trespass offense which was dismissed as part of 
the plea agreement. 
Thereafter on February 15th, 1989, the Defendant's 
counsel Earl S. Spafford withdrew from the Defendant's 
representation and on February 24th, 19S9 a notice of appeal was 
filed by George T. Waddoups as attorney for the Defendant Frank 
David Gentry. Mr. Waddoups then motioned this Court to allow the 
Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea on April 6th, 1989. An 
additional request was made to remand the matter to the Circuit 
Court for preliminary hearing. In the original motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea the Defendant raised questions of whether or net 
:
4r. Centry understood the plea agreement and whether he was able 
to hear and understand the colloquy between himself and the Court 
at the time that he entered his plea. There is no support for 
those assertions in the record. Thereafter the Defendant's motion 
to v/ithdraw the guilty plea was argued to the Court on May 1st, 
1989 and Mr. Waddoups raised orally during that argument the issue 
of whether or not the elements of the offense should have been 
explained to Kr. Gentry during the taking of his plea. 
In view7 of the Defendant's assertion of the latter 
argument on May 1, 1989, the Court granted the prosecution's 
motion for additional time to answer the allegations set forth by 
Mr. Waddoups and the matter was continued to June 1st, 1989 at 
1:30 p.m. to allow additional time for counsel to submit memoranda. 
All parties having submitted their memoranda and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court now enters 
the following ruling: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDEPED that the Motion to withdraw the 
plea of guilty filed by Frank David Gentry is DENIED. The Court 
finds that the Defendant had participated in a day long trial to 
the bench and was well aware of the allegations against him and 
the factual underpinnings of those allec?tions. In addition, the 
Court was prepared and is new prepared to enter its determination 
that the Defendant was in fact proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt at the time of that trial of both the Third Degree Felony 
which he entered a plea of guilty and the Class C Misdemeanor of 
Criminal Trespass which was dismissed as part of the plea 
agreement. There was never any doubt that Mr. Gentry fully 
understood and heard all of the proceedings surrounding his plea 
of guilty as his answers and comments clearly demonstrate. In 
view of this Order, the request to remand the matter to the 
Circuit Court for an additional preliminary hearing is moot and 
therefore DENIED. 
DATED this /— day of September, 1989. 
£2 
. i^IILI? EV 
itth Distri Judge 
MAILING CEPTIFICATE 
ify that on this /^F day of ^Mtl/^kV. 
t copy of the above and foregoina'was 
I hereby cert: 
1989, a true and correc .t gc 
railed, first class postage prepaid, or hand delivered, to: 
#c b a -T^^r*& 
Iron County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 428 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
George T. Waddoups, Esq. 
Twelfth Floor 
310 South Main Street 





MR, ~ GENTRY Yes. 
waive the jury? 
MR (" GENTRY ¥ es, we are. 
MR. SPAFPORD: And to have Judge Eves try the case as 
tj i e trier 0|: fact? 
MR- C GENTRY: Yes. 
MR. SPAFFORD: And you recognize that we've explained 
that to you, tha t: 3 m idge Eves would apply the same standard 
of evidence and the same assessment of things that 
happened as :I I: he were t:Jih e jr iry? 
MR. GENTRY !ires . 
I1 II III I II A K M I III'Mill I Il II , I H I s i t i i d a I i n I I M l I I Jl'i" 
'ves would have the additional ipsponsibi1ify of applying 
; 
MR GENTRY !<!! es. 
MR GENTRY: Xes. 
MR. SPAFFORD: Now, are you, satisfied with us 
proceed ing In that fashion? 
MR
 G E N T R Y N o 
MR. GENTRY „ , „, 
MR. v* *xx> III I i : . 'on I line r ight that 
* i have to exclude witnesses You will recall tha t that 
in ! i l : 1 111 i i I, ii11' is»J :!! i l l ::! i l a i IIKJ , 
ADDENDUM D 
MP F GENTRY- ! do, 
THE nnriRT /" ll ,l I -v Mr Curtis Gentry did 
answer vocally, jod I do appreciate that. 
5 MR, KIMBAL; Excuse ne je s? - « Your Honor. My 
6
 ciient, prank Gen' • I •' "l li h.i I ul hearing; so, we 
7 1 may need sometimes lo repeat things or tu speak <±s ioi 
8 as poss ible 
9 I T"»V ','UUT we'll certainly try to do that. Can you 
10 hear me all right, Mr. Gentry? 
ME F GENTRY: Yes T woul 1 appreciate if you'd talk 
slow and with a little more VOJIHJI I 161 n In lune 
JLO i THE iM'ih1 l1 || try to do that ..ill right ? 
i J
' MR KIMBALL. Thank you, iuur Hoi -
THF i iHi Burns, are you ready to proceed? 
Mh BURNS i dm ", 'V'nt" Honor. 
THE COURT i i i ii IIICFI an opening statement? 
BURNS briefly, Ynur Honor. 
: - THE COURT. uo a m • 
; ,M. q. Yo'ir Honor, t h e S rat:e wr ings be fo r e ni>u 
2, , today the casti « • ^t^Lm 0 f n\ ,t . ., p., »• r n „ „ p ' . e n t r y and 
2 » > ••! i, Gentry The State has charged each of 
23 them w i t h theff A Third-Degrf HI I I *in»m 
24 I li I i1 t r e spass . 
25 The e v i d e n c e ..-~~ <**Aw*r L u a a y — «• I i In IJ JI 
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property. 
That he also will not commit any vexatious or 
other act in the form of a verbal or written 
communication. And that upon completion of an 18-month 
period of probation, during which he does not assert 
any claim or trespass upon the property, the Court 
would favorably entertain a motion to change the plea 
and dismiss the charges against him. 
In this regard, Your Honor, and as a 
condition of the entry of this plea, we would represent 
that we will dismiss the civil action that has been 
filed in connection therewith. 
Now, may I ask Frank if you understand what I 
said? 
MR. P. GENTRY: I have to say I couldn't hear it 
all, Earl. 
MR. SPAPPORD: All right. What I!ve done is 
repeated exactly what I told you in the hall. 
Did you understand that? 
MR. P. GENTRY: Yes. 
MR. SPAPPORD: Are you agreeable to that? 
MR. P. GENTRY: It's going to take more than 10 
days to remove our stuff. 
MR. SPAPFORD: Well, you1re not going to go on the 
property at all, and Curtis will work it out with the 
George T. Waddoups 
Watkiss & Campbell 
31»" .?. . Main 3t 
JERRY MARSDEN, M.D. 
A Professional Corporation 
515 South 300 East Suite 207 
St. George, Utah 84770 
801-628-2891 
Mi DV ember 3 D. ] 989 
Rt- : Frar.r. u e r! r .•' 
Deai Waddoups: 
Mr. Gentry was seen in my office on the 30th of November. 
Historically, he has had diminished auditory acuity since World 
War II when he was invo] ved in approximately two explosions. 
Examination showed Mr. Gentry to have occlusion of his left 
external auditory canal from a cerumen impaction, which was 
removed, Hi s h e ad and neck e xami n at i on was t h e n wi t h in norma1 
II mi t s . 
An Audi ogr am 'ra„s obt a I,ned :: i i Mr Gent r y wh i : :h s howed a 
significant high frequency neurosensory hearing loss in both ears 
with his left ear being more impaired than his right His speech 
di scriminat i on was f a,ir in 'each ?,-i * " ' ib L1 i ty t o 
u n d e r s t a n d s p e e c h) « 
I would regard Mr „ Gentry as having a significant high frequency 
neurosensory hearing loss. This undoubtedly was significantly 
compounded by the cerumen impaction which totally occluded his 
left ear, I Isually patients with this type of hearing loss will 
function adequately in a face to face situation in a closed room, 
but when they are presented with background noise or attempt to 
h ave c o nve r s a t i o ns i n a large room, th e i r unde r s t a nd i n g o £ wh a t 
i s b e i n g s a i d i s e :x t r e in e 1 y i mp a i r e d , 
I f I c a n p r o v i d e f u i t h e i :i n f o r m a t i o n 
contact me 
H ! Gentry, please 
Sincerely, 
)&«.[ li'jamlitf: f//0, 
) 
Jerry Marsden, M.D, 
Dipiomateof American 
Academy of Otolaryngology -
Head and Neck Surgery 
Fellow of American 
College of Surgeons 
Fellow of American 
Academy of Facial 
Plastic and 
ADDENDUM E 
propertv ir a" pute Is to be ] eft on the ranch, and, 
you" . * *• r * settle that In a civil court. 
R'"I ':;» rav. 
MR1, SPAFFORD, - • or)v , And we would contemplate 
d -am J ss i . 
MI »i 11 id you understand that question and my 
a n s w ' i p in ! I I ? 
MR. C. GENTRY: ^oncern inc •* s ounded , I k e ; t 
was i I'm in e rri in mi inI ji l I if11 
y o u ' r e g o i n g t o f igr;* . ^ r •* p i c t u r e frame and 
t l i a L WOUi(j g 0 t o a 
right"* 
THE COURT: If you both ge t up Hie tip rim 
e n m
^ p r o p e r t y be longs t o yon, and they «' l a i n 
•>f - -<*. ^ ^ t h Line ranc li then yon leave I t t h e r e , and 
1
 vour Ounipla m t in smai 1 i la ims c o u r t or 
ever and you let a judge l i t i g a t e t h a t . 
' I N Ill 
COURT: All right WHi.il #:j 1 se y Have we covered 
e- - ? 
MR. SPAPFORD: " ' 1 1nk we've covered everything, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's a complicated plea agreement, bu'"I 
" "ifc* ^ « circumstances In tni t •, i l il o 
an appropriate resolution, of the issues. 
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1 other claim. 
2 MR. BURNS: Okay. We can put that in. 
3 THE COURT: But in your dismissal of the civil case 
4 I that's been filed, it seems like you can cover that. 
5 MR. BURNS: We'll take care of that, yes. 
6 I THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
7 MR. BURNS: Nothing from the State. 
8 MR. SPAFFORD: I think thatfs it. 
9 MR. BURNS: The State agrees upon the defendant's 
10 plea to a third-degree felony theft, 
11 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Frank Gentry, will you 
12 come forward and stand up here by your attorney, 
13 please. Just stand right there. This is fine. Just 
14 stand right here close where I can talk to you, Frank. 
15 I want you to be in a position where you can hear me. 
16 Mr. Gentry, as you know, you're entitled to a 
17 trial in this matter, and we have been engaged today in 
18 that trial. 
19 1 Do you understand that? 
20 MR. F. GENTRY: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: And you're entitled to have the State 
22 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed the 
23 charges that are before this court. 
24 Do you understand that? 
25 MR. F. GENTRY: Yes, sir. 
